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Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards and Corporate Value: 
A Cross-Country Analysis 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the relation between corporate value and the fraction of independent 
directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries.  We find a 
positive relation, especially in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders.  The 
findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in 
part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder 
protection by appointing an ‘independent’ board.  The cost to the dominant shareholder 
of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder.  Thus, 
not all dominant shareholders will choose independent boards. 
Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards and Corporate Value: 
A Cross-Country Analysis 
 
This paper is an empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate 
value and board composition in firms with a dominant shareholder.  The question 
addressed is whether a ‘strong’ board can offset the market value discount in firms 
domiciled in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders.  Such a discount has 
been documented by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (CDFL) (2002), Durnev and 
Kim (DK) (2005), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (2002).  
This discount is often attributed to the ability of a dominant shareholder to divert 
corporate resources from other shareholders to himself for personal consumption, 
especially in countries with weak legal shareholder protection.  In essence, the question 
that we address is whether a dominant shareholder could, were he so inclined, increase 
firm value by appointing a ‘strong’ board with a mandate of assuring minority investors 
that he will refrain from diversion of the firm’s resources and whether the effect of board 
composition on firm value, if there is any, is different between countries with weak and 
those with strong legal shareholder protection. 
The studies most closely related to ours are Durnev and Kim (DK) (2005) and 
Klapper and Love (KL) (2004).  Among other things, these studies empirically 
investigate the relationship between firm value and the ‘quality’ of a firm’s corporate 
governance where the proxies for the quality of governance are two firm-specific indices: 
the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) corporate governance scores and the 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) transparency rankings.  As do the other studies cited above, 
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these two report that proxies for Tobin’s Q (i.e., firm market-to-book value ratios) are 
lower in countries with weak legal shareholder protection.  They further report, however, 
that the value discount is less in firms with higher corporate governance scores.  We 
complement these studies by exploring what role, if any, the composition of the board of 
directors has in reducing the value discount in firms with a dominant shareholder across 
countries with strong and weak legal shareholder protection.   
The premise underlying our analysis goes as follows.  Dominant shareholders 
have an incentive and, in the absence of a countervailing force, the ability to divert 
corporate resources from other shareholders to themselves for personal consumption.  
Such diversion reduces the observed market value of the firm.  In some instances, 
however, a dominant shareholder may be willing to reduce his diversion of corporate 
resources in exchange for an increase in firm value.  The most likely instance in which 
this will occur is when the dominant shareholder wishes to sell equity either on personal 
account (for diversification or consumption purposes) or through the firm (to undertake 
positive NPV projects).   
The problem for the dominant shareholder is convincing minority shareholders 
that he will refrain from diverting resources.  We propose that one way in which he can 
do so is by appointing a ‘strong’ board of directors charged with a mandate of curbing the 
dominant shareholder’s diversion of corporate resources.  This proposition raises, at least, 
three related questions.   
First, can the appointment of a ‘strong’ board be an effective deterrent to resource 
diversion given that the dominant shareholder can just as easily remove directors as 
appoint them?  In such circumstances, appointment of a strong board would be unlikely 
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to increase firm value.  A counter argument is that, at the margin, if replacement of strong 
directors is costly to the dominant shareholder for any reason, appointment of a strong 
board could at least ameliorate the loss in value associated with a firm having a dominant 
shareholder.   
And that leads to the second question - - what incentive does a director have to 
monitor a dominant shareholder who can replace him?  That is, even if there are marginal 
costs to the dominant shareholder of replacing directors who monitor him too closely, 
what incentives do such directors have to monitor?   
The answer to this question lies in the market for directors.  As Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue “[e]ffective separation of top-level decision management and control means 
that outside directors have incentives to carry out their tasks and not collude with 
managers to expropriate residual claimants … .”1  The incentive arises because “…there 
is substantial devaluation of human capital when internal control breaks down...”2  Given 
a market for outside directors occurs, the failure to monitor implies a loss in human 
capital for ineffective directors.  This argument holds together only so long as a market 
for outside directors occurs.   
The third question is - - what power does an outside director have to control the 
dominant shareholder even if he does choose to be an effective monitor?  Outside 
directors may derive their power legally, contractually or implicitly.  As we will 
document, in many of the countries in our sample, directors have a legal responsibility to 
monitor on behalf of minority shareholders, but that may not be the primary source of 
their power.  Rather, assuming that directors suffer losses in human capital when they fail 
                                                          
1 Fama and Jensen (1983), p. 315. 
2 Ibid, p. 315. 
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to monitor, ex ante, directors will seek assurances, either contractually or implicitly, from 
the dominant shareholder that they will have the freedom to monitor effectively.   
Our foregoing discussion frames the issues that we address empirically.  We 
conduct our analysis with data on boards of directors for 799 firms with dominant 
shareholders from 22 countries.  We classify directors as ‘affiliated’ with the dominant 
shareholder or ‘independent.’  We use an expansive definition of affiliated such that 
affiliated directors encompass more than just the executives of the firm and our definition 
of an independent director is narrower than ‘outside’ directors where any non-executive 
is typically considered an outside director.  We find that there does appear to be a robust 
market for independent directors - - of the XX independent directors in our sample, XX% 
of them serve on multiple boards.   
We also find that firms with independent boards are significantly more likely to 
issue equity than are other firms in our sample.  Thus, the demand to sell shares appears 
to be a determinant of board composition.  These two sets of results provide a foundation 
for our primary analysis. 
In our primary analysis, we estimate regressions in which the dependent variable 
is firms’ market-to-book value ratios (as a proxy for Tobin’s Qs) and the independent 
variables are country levels of shareholder protection, the fraction of the board made up 
of independent directors, and various control variables.   
Consistent with prior studies, we find that Q ratios are positively correlated with 
the country level of legal shareholder protection: on average, lower country levels of 
legal shareholder protection are associated with lower market-to-book ratios.  We also 
find that, after controlling for country-level of legal shareholder protection (and other 
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factors), Qs are positively correlated with the fraction of the board composed of 
independent directors: a higher fraction of independent directors is associated with a 
higher Q ratio.  Further, we find that the relationship between market-to-book ratios and 
the fraction of independent directors is stronger in countries with weaker legal protection 
for shareholders.   
As a final step in our analysis, we seek to identify evidence of ways in which 
independent directors constrain resource diversion by dominant shareholders.  Perhaps 
the most frequently cited mechanism through which dominant shareholders are alleged to 
divert resources is by arranging disadvantageous transactions between the publicly traded 
firms that they control and other firms also controlled by the dominant shareholder in 
which the dominant shareholder has a larger ownership position.  Such deals are referred 
to as related party transactions and the diversion of resources in this way is often labeled 
tunneling. 
We examine the occurrence of related party transactions by the firms in our 
sample with a regression analysis.  After controlling for other factors, the occurrence of 
related party transactions is negatively correlated with the fraction of the board 
comprising independent directors: a higher proportion of independent directors is 
associated with a lower likelihood of a related party transaction.   
Thus, the evidence indicates that a dominant shareholder is more likely to appoint 
independent directors when his firm intends to issue equity, that a higher proportion of 
independent directors is associated with a lower incidence of related party transactions, 
that firms without related party transactions have higher values than firms with related 
party transactions and that firm values are positively correlated with the proportion of 
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independent directors comprising the board.  Finally, each of these relationships is more 
significant in countries with weak legal protection for outside shareholders. 
Fundamental to the interpretation of our results is the assumption that 
‘independent’ directors lead to a ‘stronger’ board.  Accepting that assumption as true, our 
results imply that stronger boards are associated with higher equity values in firms with a 
dominant shareholder and this relationship is more consequential in countries with weak 
shareholder legal protection.  Numerical analysis indicates that this relationship is not 
only statistically but also economically significant especially in countries with weak legal 
protection for shareholders.   
Our study contributes to the literature on the effect of country-level legal systems 
on corporate activities and corporate value (e.g., Beck, Levine & Loayza (2000), 
Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003), Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (JBBF) 
(2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), LLSV (1997, 1999, 2002), and Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) among others), to the literature on the effect of board composition on corporate 
value and performance (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber (AK) (1996, 2001), Bhagat and Black 
(BB) (2002), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005), Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002), 
and Hermalin and Weisbach (HW) (1991, 2003), among others), and, peripherally, to the 
literature on the value of shareholder voting rights (e.g., Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1992), 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Grossman and Hart (1988), Lease, McConnell, and 
Mikkelson (1983, 1984), and Zingales (1994) among others).  
Section I presents the background and motivation for this study along with a 
review of related literature.  Section II describes the data collection procedures and gives 
certain descriptive statistics for the sample.  Section III presents univariate tests of the 
7 
relationship between Q and the percentage of the board composed of independent 
directors.  Section IV presents multivariate tests of this relationship.  Section V presents 
the results of various tests of robustness including instrumental variable regressions that 
control for the possible endogeneity between board composition and firm value and 
variations in empirical procedures and variable specifications.  Section VI provides a 
commentary on the results and concludes. 
I. Background and Related Literature 
It is well documented that, in most countries, large publicly traded firms are not 
widely held.  Rather, ownership and control of such firms typically vest with a dominant 
shareholder.3  Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (1999), Davies (2000), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and others argue that, in such firms, the primary agency conflict is not 
between owners and managers, but between the dominant shareholder, who has the 
power to divert corporate resources to himself, and other shareholders.  DK (2005), 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (DKS) (2004a) and LLSV (2002) further observe that this 
agency conflict is likely to be most acute in countries that afford weak legal protection to 
minority shareholders.  This occurs because, in such countries, it is argued, the dominant 
shareholder has greater ability to extract resources that otherwise would have been shared 
with minority investors.   
LLSV (2002) go on to develop a model in which firm value depends upon the 
profits generated by the firm, the amount of profits diverted from productive use by the 
dominant shareholder, and the cost of diverting profits.  They assume that the cost of 
diversion is greater in countries with stronger shareholder protection.  As a consequence, 
                                                          
3  For example, in La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, and Shleifer (LLS) (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(CDL) (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). 
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less diversion occurs and firm value is higher.  DK (2005), LLSV (2002), and Lins 
(2003) conduct empirical investigations and report that Tobin’s Q are higher in countries 
with stronger country-level legal shareholder protection.  These results support the LLSV 
analysis.   
In the LLSV (2002) model, the dominant shareholder is largely at the mercy of 
the legal environment in which his firm resides.  That is, given his level of ownership, the 
model does not afford the dominant shareholder the ability to provide extra-legal 
assurances to outside investors that he will not divert resources.  The result is that the 
level of diversion and, therefore, the loss in value due to diversion is beyond the control 
of the dominant shareholder.  
DK (2005) and DKS (2004a,b) present models in which the dominant shareholder 
can take steps to overcome the loss in value associated with weak country-level legal 
shareholder protection.  These steps involve a commitment on the part of the dominant 
shareholder to curtail his future diversion of corporate resources for personal 
consumption.  In the DKS (2004b) model, the dominant shareholder can choose to list the 
shares of his firm on the stock exchange of a country with stronger legal shareholder 
protection.  Doing so reduces the dominant shareholder’s ability to divert corporate 
resources (i.e., raises the costs of diversion) and, thereby, raises the firm’s equity value.  
Benos and Weisbach (BW) (2004), Siegel (2005), Stulz (1999), and Reese and Weisbach 
(RW) (2002) present similar arguments.  DKS (2004b), Miller (1999), and RW (2002) 
report empirical evidence consistent with this argument.   
In the DK (2005) and DKS (2004a) models, the dominant shareholder can choose 
a higher ‘quality’ of internal corporate governance for his firm.  As with a cross-border 
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listing to a country with stronger legal protection, the higher quality of governance 
increases the cost of diversion to the dominant shareholder with the consequence that less 
diversion occurs and firm value is higher.  DK (2005) and KL (2004) estimate cross-firm 
cross-country regressions in which proxies for firms’ Tobin’s Qs are the dependent 
variable and the independent variables include an index of country-level legal 
shareholder protection along with measures of the firm-specific ‘quality’ of corporate 
governance.  As proxies for the quality of corporate governance they use the CLSA 
corporate governance scores and the S&P transparency rankings.  The results of their 
analyses support the DK (2005) and DKS (2004a) models in that market-to-book asset 
ratios are positively correlated with the country-level of legal shareholder protection and 
with the firm-specific measures of the quality of corporate governance.  The implication 
is that a dominant shareholder can increase the value of his firm by improving the quality 
of his firm’s internal governance mechanisms even in countries with weak legal 
shareholder protection. 
Our study complements the DK (2005) and KL (2004) analyses by focusing on 
the firm’s board of directors.  Arguably the board of directors is a central building block 
of a firm’s corporate governance structure.  Indeed, both the CLSA and the S&P scores 
give weight to qualitative and quantitative board characteristics.4  
It is not unreasonable to expect that a ‘stronger’ board could offset, at least in 
part, the loss in value associated with weak country-level legal shareholder protection.  A 
‘strong’ board endowed with a mandate to monitor the dominant shareholder on behalf of 
                                                          
4 For example, the CLSA index is based on the answers by financial analysts to 70 questions.  The survey 
includes such questions as “Is it true that there has been no controversy or question raised over whether the 
board or senior management have made decisions in the past 5 years that benefit them, at the expense of 
shareholders?” And “Does the company have an audit committee … chaired by a perceived genuine 
independent director?” 
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minority shareholders could raise the cost of diversion to the dominant shareholder and, 
thereby, reduce diversion and increase value.  There is, however, a reasonable argument 
that appointment of a ‘strong’ board will have little or no effect on corporate value.   
Specifically, Bebchuk (1999) argues that certain actions by the dominant 
shareholder that are apparently designed to curb his diversion of private benefits are 
unlikely to provide concrete assurances to outside shareholders.  Appointment of a 
‘strong’ board, for example, may be ineffective because a dominant shareholder can 
easily replace strong directors with weak ones, and this is may be especially so in 
countries with weak legal shareholder protection.5  The result is that appointment of a 
strong board in such circumstances will not increase firm value.  The opposing argument 
is that, at the margin, if replacement of strong directors is costly at all, appointment of a 
strong board could at least reduce the loss in value associated with a firm having a 
dominant shareholder.  
As we noted at the outset a positive marginal cost for removing strong directors is 
not in itself sufficient to increase firm value.  Directors must also have an incentive and 
the power to influence the actions of the dominant shareholder.  As regards the incentive, 
if there is a market for directors and if poor performance by a director reduces the value 
of his human capital, then directors will have an incentive to monitor the dominant 
shareholder.  The evidence on this issue is mixed.  On the one hand, studies by Coles and 
Hoi (2003), Gilson (1990), Harford (2003), and Kaplan and Reishaus (1990) indicate that 
the number of boards on which a director sits is positively related to the performance of 
the firms on which an incumbent director sits.  On the other hand, studies by Core, 
                                                          
5 Similar arguments apply to cross-listings.  According to Nasdaq data, several hundred foreign firms 
delisted over the period 2000-2004. 
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Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that firm 
performance suffers when outside director sit on “too many” boards.  The former studies 
appear to imply that strong board oversight is rewarded with more board appointments, 
while the latter studies appear to suggest the opposite. 
As for the power to curb the dominant shareholder’s diversion, such power can 
arise from legal, contractual or implicit constructs.  As we will document, in many of the 
countries in our sample directors have a legal responsibility to monitor on behalf of 
minority shareholders.  But the primary source of their power may come from their 
explicit and implicit negotiations with the dominant shareholder prior to their 
appointment.  Assuming that directors suffer losses in their reputational capital when they 
fail to curb the dominant shareholder’s actions, outside directors will demand upfront 
assurances that they will have the power to monitor effectively.  And although we do not 
have large sample evidence to support that presumption, we have come across at least 
some anecdotal evidence: In 2003, the board of Hollinger International (HI) ousted its 
chairman, Conrad Black, and sued him for $200 million for misuse of funds.  At the time, 
Black owned 17% of the shares of Hollinger Inc.6 which owned 30% of the cash flow 
rights and 78% of the voting rights of HI.   
Of course, the actions of the board need not be as dramatic as in HI to have an 
effect.  The appropriate benchmark for judging whether a board has the power to reduce 
diversion of resources is not whether a ‘strong’ board can monitor the dominant 
shareholder perfectly, the benchmark is whether the board can reduce diversion of 
resources relative to a ‘weak’ board in the otherwise identical circumstances. 
                                                          
6 And 84% of the voting rights through Ravleston corporation. 
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As regards the demand by dominant shareholders for a strong board, we have 
argued that such a demand is most likely to arise when the dominant shareholder wishes 
to sell shares either on personal account or through his firm.  That is, only when the 
dominant shareholder wishes to sell shares will he be concerned abut the market value of 
his firm.  Consistent with the idea that better governance at the firm level is associated 
with the demand for capital, DK (2005) find a positive correlation between the “need for 
funds” and CLSA scores.  Similarly, RW (2002) find that firms that cross-list their stock 
on U.S. exchanges increase their equity issues following listing and that this increase is 
greatest for cross-listings from countries with weak legal shareholder protection.   
How strong boards curtail a dominant shareholder’s ability to divert is difficult to 
identify precisely.  Presumably, if they do so, it is through an ongoing process of 
monitoring and control.  However, one way in which dominant shareholders are alleged 
to divert is through related party transactions.  In such transactions, the dominant 
shareholder arranges a deal between two companies in which he holds a controlling 
interest.  He arranges the deal so as to provide favorable terms to the firm in which he has 
a larger percentage equity ownership and disadvantageous terms to the firm in which he 
holds a smaller ownership position.   
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathn (2002) report evidence of evidence of transfers 
among Indian pyramidal firms consistent with wealth transfers from firms lower down 
the pyramid to firms higher up the ownership chain in which the dominant shareholder 
has alarger ownership position.  Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) find that dominant 
shareholders in Korean chaebol firms gain when a chaebol-affiliated firm undertakes an 
acquisition while minority shareholders in the chaebol lose.  Cheung, Jing, Rau and 
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Stouraitis (2006) find that in China local governments extract resources from publicly 
traded firms in which they have significant ownership positions by entering into contracts 
on terms disadvantageous to the publicly traded enterprise.7  Perhaps a board composed 
of directors independent of the government can reduce such disadvantageous 
transactions.   
Given the potentially pivotal role of the board in assuring higher quality 
governance and given competing arguments regarding the valuation effects of an 
apparently ‘strong’ board, we set out to examine whether firm value is higher in firms 
with a dominant shareholder that have ‘stronger’ boards and whether the relation between 
firm value and board structure is different in countries with low versus high levels of 
legal shareholder protection.  That is, we are asking whether a dominant shareholder who 
desires to increase the market value of his firm could do so by appointing more 
‘independent’ directors and whether such a decision has more effect in a country that 
provides weak as opposed to strong legal protection for shareholders.   
As corollary issues, we also investigate whether the directors in our sample 
appear to have reputational capital at risk, whether there is a correlation between the 
fraction of the board made up of independent directors and the propensity of the firm to 
issue equity, whether the market value of firms with related party transactions is different 
from the market value of other firms, and whether the occurrence of related party 
transactions is correlated with the proportion of the board composed of independent 
directors.  
II. Sampling Procedure and Data 
                                                          
7 Other studies of related party transactions include Atanasov (2005), Cheung, Rau and Stouratis (2005), 
and Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) among others. 
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II.A  Firms and dominant shareholders 
To conduct our empirical analysis, we assemble data on share ownership and 
boards of directors for firms from the 22 countries listed in table I.8  These are the 
countries for which we have been able to locate data on both variables.9   
Our first task is to identify firms with a dominant shareholder where a dominant 
shareholder is one who can significantly influence selection of the firm’s board.  While it 
is possible, and perhaps likely, that in some cases, more than one large shareholder can 
influence the composition of the board, we assume that the firm has a single influential or 
dominant shareholder.  Thus, we search for the largest single owner of voting rights in 
each firm provided that the shareholder controls at least 10% of the firm’s votes.   
Further, we are interested in the firm’s ‘ultimate’ shareholder so as to be able to 
identify directors affiliated with this ultimate owner.  As has been widely documented, 
many publicly-traded firms are controlled through pyramidal ownership structures (e.g., 
CDL (2000) and LLS (1999) and others).  For that reason, we trace the ownership of 
voting rights through an ownership “tree” to identify an ultimate owner.  We consider a 
shareholder of Company A to be an ultimate owner when the shareholder is an individual 
or a family, a privately-held operating company, a privately-held financial firm, or a 
government.  Additionally, when the shares of Company A are owned by a publicly-
traded corporation, Company B, that has a shareholder with 10% or more of voting rights 
in one of these categories, that shareholder is considered to be the dominant shareholder 
                                                          
8 The countries are mostly economically developed.  To the extent that shareholder protection fosters 
economic development, the countries in our sample will have less dispersion on this dimension than a 
broader sample and, as such, the tests may be biased against the finding of any effect of board composition 
on corporate value. 
9 The key factor limiting our analysis to companies from 22 countries listed in table I is data on board 
members.  In 14 additional countries, we are able to locate ownership data for the 70 largest companies but 
are unable to find information on board membership. 
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of Companies A and B.  If the shares in Company A are held by Company B and 
Company B has no dominant shareholder, then Company A is also considered to have no 
dominant shareholder.  Once an ultimate dominant shareholder has been identified, we 
search to identify affiliations between that shareholder and members of the firm’s board. 
To assemble our sample, for each country listed in table I, we identify the largest 
publicly-traded industrial companies in terms of equity market capitalization as of 
December 2002 included in Worldscope with up to a maximum of 70 companies in any 
one country.10  Worldscope does not list 70 such companies for Korea, Mexico and South 
Africa.  For these countries, we have 29, 40 and 56 firms, respectively, resulting in an 
initial sample of 1,455 firms.    
For each firm, for which data are available as of year-end 2002, we extract the 
identity and percentage voting rights of each shareholder who holds more than 10% of 
the voting rights outstanding from the sources listed in Appendix A.  Certain of the data 
sources are country specific.  The sources are listed in the order in which they have been 
used to collate ownership information.  That is, if data for a firm are available in the first 
source listed in Appendix A, we use that source.  If not, we move to the next source, and 
so on, until we gather data for each sample firm.  If data are not available for year-end 
2002, we move to year-end 2001.  We are able to find ownership data for all but 23 firms.   
As we noted, in the first step of our search algorithm, we identified all 
shareholders with ownership of at least 10% of the firm’s voting rights.  In firms with 
more than one such shareholder, we checked to determine whether two or more of these 
blocks were affiliated such that their combined ownership of voting rights exceeded that 
                                                          
10 We exclude financial institutions and utilities, specifically SIC codes 49, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67. 
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of the largest single shareholder.  If so, these blocks were combined to comprise the 
single largest shareholder.11   
Using our search procedure and traveling up the ownership tree, we determined 
that 1,055 of the firms in our initial sample have an ultimate dominant shareholder who 
controls at least 10% of the firm’s voting rights.  Of these ultimate owners, 216 are 
widely-held firms and, thus, the corresponding sample firms are also considered to be 
widely-held.  These are removed from the sample such that our sample is narrowed to 
839 firms with an ultimate dominant shareholder.   
Of course, voting rights are not the same as ownership rights and, as documented 
by LLS (1999), CDL (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002), the share of voting rights held 
by dominant shareholders often exceeds their proportionate claim on cash flows.  CDFL 
(2002) report that the value discount in firms with a dominant shareholder is greater the 
larger is the difference between proportionate voting and cash flow rights of the dominant 
shareholder.  Thus, for each of the 839 firms in our sample, we also determine the 
fraction of cash flow rights owned by the dominant shareholder by taking the fraction of 
cash flow rights held by the dominant shareholder and multiplying that fraction by the 
fraction of shares owned in each firm in the ownership tree.  Thus, if the ultimate 
dominant shareholder is the Smythe family that owns 50% of the shares in Company C 
and Company C owns 12% of the shares in Company B who owns 18% of the cash flow 
rights and 30% of the voting rights of Company A, we designate the Smythe family as 
                                                          
11 In addition, there are three instances in which we identify at least one dominant shareholder, but for the 
purposes of our analyses we deem these firms to be widely held.  First, in the case of a tie between the 
ultimate voting rights of two different ultimate owners, we consider the firm to be widely held.  Second, if, 
because of cross-holdings, a firm is its own largest holder, we consider the firm to be widely held.  Third, 
we consider a firm to be widely held if a financial institution holds a significant percentage of the equity of 
the firm as a trustee for its employees’ 401K plan.  These three situations occur in six firms. 
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controlling 30% of the voting rights of Company A and owning (0.50 x 0.12 x 0.18) x 
(100) = 1.08% of the cash flow rights. 
II.B Affiliated directors 
Having identified firms with dominant shareholders, we use Bloomberg, Reuters, 
EDGAR International, corporate websites, and direct contact with the companies to 
identify directors as of year-end 2002.  From this effort, we are able to find board data for 
all but 40 firms leaving a set of 799.  We conduct our empirical analyses with these.   
Determination of whether a director is affiliated with the dominant shareholder 
involves some subjectivity on our part and will necessarily embed errors.  As a guide for 
this determination, we draw upon recent corporate governance mandates and/or Codes of 
Best Governance Practice from various of the countries in our sample.  Such codes urge 
that publicly-traded firms have more independent directors and provide some general 
guidance as to scenarios under which a director’s independence might be compromised.12  
Using the Codes as a guide, we consider a director to be affiliated with the dominant 
shareholder when (1) he/she is the dominant shareholder, (2) he/she is an employee of the 
firm,13 (3) he/she is a director or employee in any company or subsidiary of any company 
that is positioned above the sample firm in the ownership tree (if there is one), (4) he/she 
has the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (5) he/she is of the same 
                                                          
12 For example, the Australian Bosch Report on Corporate Practices and Conduct (1995) stipulates that 
director independence is more likely to be assured when the director is not a substantial shareholder of the 
firm.  The Belgian Commission of Corporate Governance (1998) recommendations call for more directors 
that do not serve on boards of related firms and who have no family ties to executives.  In Greece, the 
Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) prescribe more independent directors, defined as unrelated to 
the majority owner and having no conflicts of interest.  The report prepared by the OECD on Corporate 
Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets (1998), advises “board 
independence usually requires that a sufficient number of board members not be employed by the company 
and not be related to the company or its management through significant economic, family or other ties.” 
13 We should note that, by far, the vast majority of employee directors are managers.  The exception is 
Germany wherein boards are required to include labor representatives.   
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nationality as the dominant shareholder when the dominant shareholder is a foreigner, or 
(6) he/she is a politician or employee of a government agency when the dominant 
shareholder is a government.  Directors who are not identified as being affiliated with the 
dominant shareholder are designated as ‘independent.’ 
II.C  Legal system 
The quality of legal protection afforded to minority shareholders is often viewed 
as comprising two elements: (1) statutory provisions (often termed de jure protection) and 
(2) the degree to which the statutes are enforced (often called de facto protection).  
Following Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005), DKS (2004b), DK (2005), Wurgler (2000), 
and others, we use the product of two indices as our primary proxy for the quality of legal 
environment.  The first is the Anti-director Rights index of LLSV (1998) that ranges from 
0 to 6.  The second is the Law and Order enforcement index taken from the International 
Country Risk Guide and rebalanced to range from 0 to 10.14  We refer to this product as 
LEGAL in our regression analysis.  The use of this measure has become somewhat 
customary in testing hypotheses involving standards of corporate governance.  
Nevertheless, we should note that this index is still only a proxy for the difficult-to-
capture idea of ‘quality’ of legal shareholder protection. 
II.D Tobin’s Q and other financial data 
Our primary dependent variable is the book value of assets minus the book value 
of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets (often 
referred to as Tobin’s Q).  We calculate these ratios as of the end of years 2002, 2003, 
and 2004.  For 712 firms, data for calculation of Q are from the Edgar International 
Database.  For the remaining 87 firms, data are from Worldscope.   
                                                          
14 Anti-director and Law and Order index values are for year-end 2003. 
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In conducting our primary analysis, we delete firms whose Qs are in the top and 
bottom 1% of the distribution.  We use this sample of 782 firms with a dominant 
shareholder in our initial analysis.  Of the dominant shareholders, 347 are individuals or 
families, 226 are privately-held operating or holding companies, 101 are privately-held 
financial institutions, such as investment funds, and 108 are governments.   
Control variables used in the analysis include one-digit SIC codes, annual sales, 
sales growth from 2001-2003, intangible assets as a fraction of total assets, ‘need for 
funds’ calculated as the difference between historical growth of assets and sustainable 
growth of assets (i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)) measured over 2002-200315, and variance of stock 
returns calculated with monthly returns over the 24 months 2001-2002. Tobin’s Q is 
often thought of as reflecting a firm’s future investment or growth opportunities.  The 
control variables are meant to control for differences in growth opportunities across 
firms.  The balance sheet data are for year-end 2003 and are from Worldscope and Edgar 
International.  The SIC code is the firm’s primary industry from Worldscope.  The final 
variable is a 1/0 indicator to identify firms whose shares are traded either as a direct 
listing on a US stock exchange or as an American Depository Receipt (ADR).  This 
variable is from the Bank of New York and JP Morgan ADR/Cross-listing databases and 
is meant to capture the possibility that cross-listing on a US exchange improves 
governance and increases firm value ((BW (2004), DKS (2004b), Siegel (2005), RW 
(2002)).  The sample contains 232 such firms.  We refer to this variable as CROSS-LIST. 
II.E Some descriptive statistics 
Table I presents descriptive information for the 782 firms by country of 
incorporation.  Column 1 gives the number of firms by country.  Because of the method 
                                                          
15 As developed by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and also used by Durnev and Kim (2005). 
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used to gather data, we have the largest firms (by equity market capitalization) in each 
country, but we do not have an equal number of firms from each country.  For example, 
the US is vastly under-represented.  This occurs because, among the 70 largest US firms, 
there are only 16 with a dominant shareholder.  Similarly, Japan is under-represented 
because its largest corporations are owned in a Keiretsu structure whereby the dominant 
shareholder is widely-held.  The number of firms by country ranges from 10 in Japan to 
56 in Italy.  Column 2 gives LEGAL, the product of the Anti-director Rights and Law 
and Order indices.16  This index ranges from 3.3 in Mexico to 50 in the US and the UK.   
As displayed in column 3, the mean percentage of independent directors by 
country ranges from 74.6% in the US to 36.5% in Hong Kong.  As shown in columns 4 
and 5, there is substantial variation in board composition across firms within countries.  
For example, the maximum and minimum percentages of independent directors are 
45.5% and 93.3% in the US, while they are 0.0% and 100% in France and Germany.  
Columns 6 – 8 show that there is considerable variation in board size both across and 
within countries. 
 The table also gives the mean percentage voting rights (column 9) and cash flow 
rights (column 10) of the dominant shareholder.  In each country, the mean percentage 
voting rights of the dominant shareholder exceeds his mean percentage cash flow rights 
with a spread between the two of 0.6% in Mexico up to a spread of 18.6% in Italy.   
The final set of data in table I are the mean, minimum and maximum Tobin’s Q 
for firms in each country.  Across countries, the mean Q ranges from 1.03 in Brazil to 
2.07 in Australia.  As with board composition and board size, Qs show considerable 
                                                          
16 The individual components of the indices are available from the authors. 
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within country variation.  For example, Qs range from 1.03 to 5.29 in Australia and from 
0.74 to 6.67 in India.   
We now investigate whether the variation in Q ratios across firms is 
systematically related to board composition. 
III. Univariate Statistical Analysis 
 Table II presents the results of preliminary statistical analysis.  Panel A gives 
mean and median Qs according to the level of legal shareholder protection, LEGAL.  
Countries are classified into three groups according to LEGAL with the eight countries 
having LEGAL ≥ 30 in group 1, the five countries with 30 > LEGAL ≥ 20 in group 2 and 
the nine countries with LEGAL < 20 in group 3.  Qs vary systematically across levels of 
shareholder legal protection with higher protection associated with higher Qs: the mean Q 
of 1.58 for group 1 is significantly greater than the mean Q of 1.38 in group 3 (p-value = 
0.01).  The test of medians supports the test of means (p-value < 0.01).  Stronger country-
level legal shareholder protection is associated with higher firm values. 
Panel B of table II, gives mean and median Qs when the sample of firms is split 
into three groups according to the percentage of independent directors.  Firms with more 
than 66.7% independent directors comprise group 1, firms with 33.3% to 66.7% 
independent directors comprise group 2, and firms with less than 33.3% independent 
directors comprise group 3.  Mean and median Qs increase monotonically with the 
increase in the fraction of independent directors and the differences in means and 
medians between groups 1 and 3 are statistically significant (p-values < 0.01).  ‘Stronger’ 
boards are associated with higher market values.  
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 Panel C of table II gives mean and median Qs for three groups of firms according 
to board size:  those with boards having 7 or fewer directors (small boards), those with 8 
to 11 directors, and those having 12 or more directors (big boards).  The three groups 
contain approximately equal numbers of firms.  Mean and median Qs tend to decline as 
board size increases, but the decline in medians is not monotonic across the three groups.  
Thus, larger boards tend to be associated with lower market values, but the relationship is 
not pervasive.   
LLSV (2002) report that, in firms with a dominant shareholder, Q is positively 
related to the percentage of cash flow rights owned by the dominant shareholder.  They 
interpret this to mean that higher cash flow ownership increases the incentive of the 
dominant shareholder to increase corporate value.  In panel D of table II, firms are sorted 
into three groups according to the percentage cash flow rights of the dominant 
shareholder.  In group 1, the dominant shareholder has cash flow rights > 45.6%, in group 
2, 45.6% ≥ cash flow rights ≥ 20.6%, and in group 3, cash flow rights < 20.6%.  The 
three groups have roughly equal numbers of firms.  On a univariate basis, neither mean 
nor median Qs increase as cash flow rights of the dominant shareholder increase and the 
differences in mean and median Qs between the high cash flow and low cash flow 
ownership groups is not statistically significant.  On a univariate basis, higher cash flow 
rights on the part of the dominant shareholder are not associated with high firm values (at 
least not in our sample of firms with a dominant shareholder). 
IV. Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
IV.A Base case regressions 
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 The result of primary interest from our univariate analysis is that, in firms with a 
dominant shareholder, firm value varies positively with the fraction of directors who are 
‘independent’ of the dominant shareholder.  We now examine that relationship with a 
multivariate regression analysis.  Consistent with CDFL (2002), DK (2005), LLSV 
(2002) and others, we use a country random effects specification.  Henceforth, we use 
INDDIR% to represent the percentage of the board made up of independent directors. 
 Column 1 of table III presents the results of what can be thought of as our ‘base 
case’ regression.  The dependent variable is the Q ratio where Q is calculated as the 
average of the year-end 2002 and 2003 market-to-book value ratios for each firm.  The 
independent variables include LEGAL, the CROSS-LIST indicator set to one if the firm 
has a US-traded stock or ADR as of year-end 2002, the dominant shareholder’s 
percentage cash flow rights, an interaction term of percentage cash flow rights multiplied 
by LEGAL, ln (sales) for the fiscal year 2003, the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, 
the geometric average sales growth rate over the interval 2001-2003, ‘need for external 
financing’ as defined above, and the variance of stock returns.  The regression also 
includes the one-digit industry SIC code for each firm.  Unless indicated otherwise, we 
include each of these independent variables in our subsequent regressions.   
The regression in column 1 does not include our key independent variable, the 
percentage of the board made up of independent directors, nor does it include ln (board 
size).  Rather, this regression asks whether the results of prior studies are robust in our 
data.   
Consistent with LLSV (2002), DK (2005) and others, the coefficient of LEGAL is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.04).  Also consistent with LLSV (2002), the 
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coefficient of dominant shareholder’s cash flow rights is positive and (arguably) 
significant with a p-value of 0.09, while the coefficient of the interaction of cash flow 
rights and LEGAL is negative and also (arguably) significant (p-value = 0.09).  In 
subsequent regressions, these results are essentially unchanged except that in some 
specifications, the p-value of LEGAL creeps upward and reaches 0.11 in one 
specification.  Thus, in firms with a dominant shareholder, firm value is positively 
correlated with the country-level of legal shareholder protection and with the fraction of 
cash flow rights held by the dominant shareholder and negatively correlated with the 
interaction of these terms.  The implication is that firm value is higher in countries with 
stronger shareholder legal protection and is higher when the dominant shareholder has a 
larger cash flow ownership position.  However, the combination of these two factors is 
not additive.   
The coefficient of the CROSS-LIST indicator is positive, but the p-value is only 
0.16.  In later specifications, the p-values for this variable range from 0.09 to 0.56.  This 
result differs from DKS (2004b), but their sample includes nearly 5,000 observations.  
The coefficient of CROSS-LIST in our regression is a bit smaller than in theirs, but the 
major difference is the size of the standard errors.  We cannot conclude that cross listing 
on a US exchange does not increase firm value. 
Of the control variables, the only one that is statistically significant is ln (sales) 
(p-value < 0.01).  Consistent with DK (2005), the coefficient is negative indicating that Q 
decreases as firm ‘size’ increases.  This result is also robust to each of our later 
specifications.  
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The regression in column 2 of table III is a minor variation on the regression in 
column 1 such that column 2 can also be thought of as a base case regression.  The only 
difference in column 2 is that the dependent variable Q is the average of the 2003-2004 
firm market-to-book values.  We use this lead/lag specification because we will 
subsequently be concerned with the possible endogeneity of Q and INDDIR%.  One 
simple way to address this concern is to lag Q relative to the point in time at which the 
composition of the board is determined.   
Suffice it to say that the results in column 2 are essentially the same as those in 
column 1 except that the p-value of LEGAL increases from 0.04 to 0.08. 
IV.B Percentage independent directors 
We now estimate regressions with our two board variables - - INDDIR% and 
board size - - included as independent variables.  In columns 3 – 5, we estimate 
regressions with various specifications of INDDIR% along with ln (board size).   
Column 3 is a linear specification of INDDIR%.  The coefficient of INDDIR% is 
positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.02), while the coefficient of ln (board 
size) is negative and significant (p-value = 0.05).  The regression in column 4 uses a 
quadratic specification of INDDIR%.  The linear term continues to be significant (p-
value = 0.03), while the coefficient of the squared term is negative and ‘borders’ upon 
statistical significance (p-value = 0.12).  Additionally, the adjusted r2 is mildly higher 
with the quadratic specification suggesting a positive, but non-linear relationship between 
Q and the percentage of independent directors.  The coefficient of ln (board size) 
continues to be negative and significant (p-value = 0.04).   
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The regression in column 5 uses the specification of ln (INDDIR%).  Because 
there are 12 firms with zero independent directors and ln (0) is undefined, we drop these 
12 observations from the sample.  The coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.02) as is the coefficient of ln (board size).  Further 
the adjusted r2 increases relative to the linear and quadratic specifications.  For that 
reason, we use the log specification in our subsequent analyses.  (As an aside, we also 
replicated every regression that we estimate later with the linear and quadratic 
specifications and the results are essentially unchanged.)  The implication of columns 4 
and 5 is that firm value increases at a decreasing rate as the percentage of independent 
directors increases (in firms with a dominant shareholder).   
For their measure of country-level legal protection, LLSV (2002) use two 
different specifications.  The first is their Anti-director Rights index; the second is the 
origin of the country’s legal system (either common law or civil code).  In regression 6, 
we replace LEGAL with the LLSV (2002) Anti-director Rights index updated to 2003 
and we replace the interaction of cash flow rights with LEGAL by the interaction of cash 
flow rights with the Anti-director Rights index.  Consistent with LLSV (2002), the 
coefficient of the Anti-director Rights index is positive with a p-value of 0.09 and the 
coefficient of interaction term is negative (but, unlike LLSV (2002), with a p-value of 
0.05, the coefficient is statistically significant).  In column 7, we replace LEGAL with an 
indicator equal to one in countries that have a common law origin and zero for all other 
countries and we interact the dominant shareholder’s percentage cash flow rights with the 
indicator.  Contrary to LLSV (2002), the coefficient of legal origin is not significant (p-
value = 0.44).  In both regressions 6 and 7, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) continues to 
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be positive and statistically significant (p-values = 0.02) and the coefficient of ln (board 
size) continues to be negative and statistically significant (p-values = 0.02).   
As we noted, one concern with our analysis is that board composition and Q are 
endogenously determined.  One simple approach to addressing endogeneity is to lag the 
dependent variable relative to the determination of key independent variable.  In the final 
regression of table III, we use lagged Q calculated as the average of year-end 2003-2004 
market-to-book ratios and board composition as of year-end 2002 along with LEGAL and 
our other variables from regression 1.  In this specification, the p-value for LEGAL slips 
to 0.11.  The p-value of ln (INDDIR%) is 0.05.  The coefficient of ln (board size) is 
negative but the p-value is 0.20. 
The answer to the first question that we posed at the outset is affirmative: in firms 
with a dominant shareholder, the documented value discount can be offset, at least in 
part, by a dominant shareholder appointing an ‘independent’ board.  This offset can even 
be achieved for firms with shares or ADRs traded on a US exchange.  That is, a dominant 
shareholder can add further value to his firm by appointing a strong board even if the 
firm’s shares are traded on a US exchange. 
IV.C Percentage independent directors when legal protection is weak 
 The second question that we posed is whether board composition has a 
differential effect in countries with strong vs. weak levels of legal protection for 
shareholders.  It can be argued that a strong board is likely to be more valuable in a 
country with weak legal shareholder protection because the potential for value added 
therein is greater given that shareholders are already protected in countries with strong 
legal environments.  Contrarily, it can be argued that a ‘strong’ board would have little 
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effect in a country with weak legal protection because the board is fundamentally at the 
mercy of the dominant shareholder in the absence of a protective legal environment.  
Under this argument, a ‘strong’ board might be more valuable in a country with a 
stronger legal environment where the board might have greater leverage through the legal 
system.  The regressions presented in table IV address these arguments.   
In particular, we estimate regression 5 of table III for countries with different 
levels of LEGAL.  In parallel with the groupings in the univariate analysis of table II, we 
estimate the regression separately for the eight countries with LEGAL ≥ 30 (i.e., high 
shareholder protection countries) and the nine countries with LEGAL < 20 (i.e., low 
protection countries).  The results are given in columns 1 and 2 of table IV.   
As shown in column 1, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) is positive and 
statistically significant in the low protection sample (p-value < 0.01).  As shown in 
column 2, the coefficient is close to zero with a p-value of 0.71 in the high protection 
sample.  Further, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) in the low protection group is 
significantly greater than the coefficient in the high protection group (p-value < 0.01). 
 The median value of LEGAL is 20.  As a further test, we estimate the regression 
with firms from the 12 countries with LEGAL ≤ 20 and with firms from the 10 countries 
with LEGAL > 20.  The results of these regressions are given in columns 3 and 4.  The 
coefficients of ln (INDDIR%) and their p-values in these two columns are essentially the 
same as those of columns 1 and 2.   
 Thus, the tests in table IV indicate that a ‘strong’ board is more important in 
offsetting the value discount associated with a dominant shareholder in a country with 
weak legal protection for shareholders.  This suggests that a dominant shareholder who is 
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so inclined could offset, at least in part, the value reduction associated with weak legal 
shareholder protection by appointing a strong board and this effect appears to be more 
consequential in countries with weaker legal protection for shareholders.   
V. Tests of Robustness 
 In this section, we take up the question of whether the results of tables III and IV 
are robust.  We begin by estimating a two-stage instrumental variables regression (2SIV) 
model to address the ever-present concern that the results are due to endogeneity.  We 
then consider other specifications of the regressions in tables III and IV. 
V.A Endogeneity addressed with instrumental variables regressions 
We estimate a linear system of two equations with Tobin’s Q and INDDIR% as 
the endogenously determined variables.  The estimation technique we use is two-stage 
least squares instrumental variable regression (2SIV) which requires that we find suitable 
instruments for the endogenous variables.  A suitable instrument is one that is correlated 
with the endogenous variable but not with the error terms in the regression equation in 
which this variable is used as a regressor.   
In line with Campa and Kedia (2002), DK (2005), HW (1991) and others, we use 
prior year’s variables as instruments for Tobin’s Q.  Specifically, we use prior year’s Q 
and the logarithm of prior year’s sales.  DK (2005) and Lins (2003) argue that industry 
indicators are also suitable instruments because they affect Q, but do not affect corporate 
governance.  We, therefore, also use one-digit SIC indicators as instruments for Q.   
In line with Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), DK (2005), and Lins (2003), we use 
the alpha and beta of the firm’s stock returns as instruments for INDDIR%.  When 
available, we use the alpha and beta from Worldscope as of 2002.  When the data are not 
30 
available in Worldscope, we estimate the firm’s alpha and beta using OLS regressions 
and the 24 monthly returns over 2001-2002 from Datastream.   
In the first stage of the 2SIV procedure we regress INDIRR% and Tobin’s Q on 
all exogenous and predetermined variables in the system.  We then use the predicted 
values from the first stage as regressors in the second stage.  We estimate two systems of 
equations.  One of them employs the firm’s average Qs for 2002-2003 and the other the 
average Qs for 2003-2004.  The independent variables are the same as those in regression 
5 in table III except that we also include country indicators and we exclude industry 
indicators from the board composition regressions.  Results from the second stage of the 
estimation are reported in table IV.   
As shown in the first regression of panel A, the coefficient of LEGAL is positive 
and significant as a predictor of ln (INDDIR%) (p-value = 0.06).  That is, firms in weak 
legal environments have fewer independent directors.  The coefficient of ln (board size) 
is positive and significant: larger boards have a higher percentage of independent 
directors.   
In the second regression of panel A, in which the dependent variable is the 
predicted Tobin’s Q for 2002-2003, ln (INDDIR%) is positive and significant (p-value = 
0.03).  The coefficient of board size continues to be negative, but its p-value slips (p-
value = 0.11) and LEGAL loses statistical significance (p-value = 0.13).   
The third and fourth regressions of table V are the same as the first two except 
that Q is the lagged average of 2003 and 2004 firm market-to-book ratios.  The results of 
regressions three and four are quite similar to those of regressions one and two.  In sum, 
based on the 2SIV analysis, firm value depends upon board composition and possibly 
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board size and legal environment, but board composition does not appear to depend upon 
firm value.  That is, causality appears to run in one direction only. 
Panel B of table V shows the results when the system is estimated separately for 
firms in countries with weak legal shareholder protection (LEGAL < 20) and for those in 
countries with strong shareholder protection (LEGAL ≥ 30).  In these regressions, we are 
asking whether the coefficient of board composition (i.e., INDDIR%) is larger and more 
significant in countries with weaker shareholder protection after controlling for possible 
endogeneity.   
The results here are similar to those of table IV.  As in table IV, in countries with 
weak legal protection for shareholders, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.04).  In countries with strong shareholder protection, 
the coefficient of INDDIR% is also positive, but much smaller and not statistically 
different from zero (p-value = 0.15).  Additionally, the coefficients of INDDIR% from 
the two regressions are significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.01).  
In short, the results in table V provide some assurance that the relationships in 
tables III and IV are not the result of reverse causality or spurious endogeneity. 
V.B Fixed country effects 
 The random country effects specifications in tables III and IV are supported by 
the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test and the Hausman specification 
test.  Nonetheless, we recognize that the countries in our sample may not be ‘truly’ 
representative of the population.  As an alternative, we estimate the regressions in tables 
III and IV with country fixed effects.  In the six regressions that correspond to the last six 
in table III, the p-values of the coefficients of INDDIR% range from 0.02 to 0.06.  In the 
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four regressions that correspond to those in table IV, the coefficients of INDDIR% are 
statistically significant in the set with low LEGAL scores (all p-values < 0.10), but are 
not close to significant in those with high LEGAL scores (p-values > 0.31).  In short, the 
results with country fixed effects regressions are nearly identical to those with country 
random effects.  
V.C Full sample including Q outliers 
 Our regressions to this point have used a trimmed sample in which we dropped 
the 17 firms with Qs in the top and bottom 1% of the distribution so as to ensure that our 
results would not be due to outliers in our independent variable.  We also estimate each 
of the regressions in tables III and IV using the full set of 799 firms for which we have 
data.  In five of the six regressions that correspond to those in table III, the p-value of 
INDDIR% is less than 0.05.  In the sixth, the lagged regression, the p-value is 0.10.  In 
the regressions that correspond to those of table IV, for the two that encompass countries 
with low LEGAL scores, the coefficients of INDDIR% are positive and statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.01). For those that include countries with high LEGAL scores, 
the coefficients do not approach statistical significance (p-values > 0.55).  Thus, our 
results are not due to the use of a trimmed sample.   
V.D Criterion for dominant shareholders 
 As our criterion for a dominant shareholder, we require that a shareholder control 
more than 10% of the firm’s votes.  An argument can be made that 10% is too few shares 
to own for a shareholder to be able to unilaterally appoint the firm’s board of directors.  
To consider what effect altering this criterion has on the results, we replicate the 
regressions of tables III and IV including only firms in which the dominant shareholder 
33 
controls at least 15% of the votes and then using a 20% cutoff.  The 15% cut-off reduces 
the sample by 103 firms, while the 20% cutoff reduces it by an additional 61 firms.  In 
the regressions that correspond to those in table III, with both the 15% and the 20% 
cutoff, the coefficients of INDDIR% are all positive and each of the p-values is slightly 
smaller than its counterpart in table III.   
In the regressions that correspond to those of table IV, with both the 15% and the 
20% cutoff, for those regressions that include countries with low LEGAL scores, the 
coefficients of INDDIR% are positive and statistically significant (p-values < 0.01).  For 
those that include countries with high LEGAL scores, the coefficients do not approach 
statistical significance (p-values > 0.57).   
Of course, as we continue to raise the threshold as to what constitutes a dominant 
shareholder, the sample continues to shrink and, not surprisingly, the coefficients of 
INDDIR% become less significant.  Thus, this analysis involves a trade-off between 
determination of a dominant shareholder and sample size.  At the customary cut-offs for 
determination of a dominant shareholder, our initial results are robust. 
V.E Wedge 
As have LLSV (2002), we use cash flow rights to capture any incentive effect of 
share ownership in firm value.  Using a variation on this theme, Baek, Kang, and Park 
(2004) and CDFL (2002) find that Q varies inversely with the difference between the 
voting rights and cash flow rights owned by the firm’s largest shareholder.  CDL (2000) 
refer to this difference as the “wedge” between control and cash flow rights.  We borrow 
this term and calculate the wedge between the percentage voting rights and the 
34 
percentage cash flow rights of the dominant shareholder as the percentage voting rights 
less the percentage cash flow rights.   
We experimented with numerous specifications using wedge in place of cash flow 
ownership.  In none of the regressions is wedge significant.  Thus, in firms in which there 
is a shareholder with dominant or controlling voting rights, greater cash flow ownership 
by the dominant shareholder is associated with higher valuation, but the magnitude of the 
spread between the dominant shareholder’s voting rights and cash flow ownership does 
not seem to influence valuation in our sample.  Our results could be due to the fact that 
we only include firms with a dominant shareholder, whereas, other studies that explore 
wedge include a broader set of firms.  Importantly, though, in each of the regression 
specifications with wedge, the coefficient of the INDDIR% has the same signs and levels 
of significance as in tables III and IV. 
V.F Government controlled firms 
 Unlike some prior studies that examine the role of dominant shareholders, we 
exclude firms whose dominant shareholder is a widely-held firm.  Our reasoning is that 
the theoretical models regarding the effect of a dominant shareholder are built on the 
presumption that a dominant shareholder diverts firm resources for personal 
consumption.  It is difficult to envision what it means for a widely-held firm to have 
personal consumption.  But we do include firms in which the government is the dominant 
shareholder on the presumption that government implies a bureaucrat who may well be 
able to divert resources.  Still, it could be argued that governments no more consume than 
do widely-held corporations.   
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Thus, we exclude firms whose dominant shareholder is a government.  This 
reduces the sample to 674 observations.  With this set of firms, we re-estimate each of the 
regressions of tables III and IV.  In the regressions that correspond to the last six in table 
III, the coefficients of INDDIR% are all positive with p-values that range from 0.04 to 
0.09.  In the four regressions that correspond to those in table IV, the coefficients of 
INDDIR% are positive and statistically significant in the set with low LEGAL scores (p-
values < 0.05), but are not close to significant in those with high LEGAL scores (p-values 
> 0.61).     
V.G Industry-adjusted Qs 
 The regressions in tables III and IV include one-digit industry indicators to 
control for any systematic industry effects in board composition.  As an alternative, we 
omitted industry indicators and replicated the regressions using industry-adjusted Qs and 
industry-adjusted sales growth along with the other variables in the tables.  To compute 
industry-adjusted Q, for each firm, we subtract the average of the firm’s home country 
one-digit industry Q for 2002-2003 from the firm’s 2002-2003 average Q.  Industry-
adjusted sales growth is the difference between the geometric growth in sales over 2001-
2003 for a sample firm and its one-digit home country industry average geometric sales 
growth over the same interval.   
For the regressions that correspond to those in table III, each of the coefficients of 
INDDIR% is positive with a p-value ≤ 0.07.  In the four regressions that correspond to 
those of table IV, for the two that encompass countries with low LEGAL scores, the 
coefficients of INDDIR% are positive and statistically significant (p-values < 0.01). For 
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those that include countries with high LEGAL scores, the coefficients do not approach 
statistical significance (p-values > 0.34).   
V.H A comparison with CLSA scores 
 DK (2005) and KL (2004) use CLSA scores in conducting their primary analyses 
of the effect of firm-specific governance on firm value.  As we noted, board factors 
comprise a component of these scores.  It could be argued that there is some other 
objective or subjective firm-specific aspect of the ‘quality’ of governance that explains 
the connection between firm value and CLSA scores and that other factor just happens to 
be correlated with board composition.  Thus, what we are observing is a spurious 
correlation between INDDIR% and firm value.   
Desirably, we would conduct a competition between CLSA scores and INDDIR% 
to determine which has the most explanatory power for Q.  Unfortunately, the CLSA 
scores are available only for emerging markets (primarily Southeast Asia) and we are 
able to find board composition for only five of the CLSA countries.  In terms of firms, 
only 67 in our sample have CLSA scores (13, 15, 16, 5 and 18 from Brazil, Hong Kong , 
India, Korea and Malaysia, respectively).  The lack of overlap in the two samples 
precludes an extensive head-to-head competition.  Additionally, Credit Lyonais has 
discontinued this service, thus, the latest available CLSA scores are as of 2001.   
Nevertheless, as a partial test, we estimated regression 5 of table III using only the 
67 firms in our sample for which CLSA scores are available.  The coefficient of ln 
(INDDIR%) is positive with a p-value of 0.09.  We then estimated the regression using 
the COMPOSITE CLSA score from DK in lieu of ln (INDDIR%).  The coefficient of 
COMPOSITE is positive, but the p-value is only 0.24.  Based on this limited analysis, 
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board composition overlaps with but captures some element of governance that is not 
encompassed by the CLSA scores.  Given that CLSA has discontinued this service, board 
composition may convey whatever information is contained in the CLSA score and, thus, 
be a robust surrogate.17 
V.I In sum 
 As in every empirical investigation, conducting our analyses involves a multitude 
of decisions about sample selection, empirical methodologies, variable selection, and 
variable specification.  Any or each of these can influence the results of a study.  We 
have examined the sensitivity of our results to alternative decisions regarding each of 
these factors.  As best we can determine, the primary conclusions drawn from our 
analyses are not due to the choices made. 
VI. Commentary and Conclusion 
 A by-product of our analysis is the finding that, after controlling for country-level 
legal protection, board composition, and other factors, the size of the board is negatively 
correlated with firm value, although the relationship is not always statistically significant.  
This result is generally consistent with the findings in studies by Eisenberg, Sundgren, 
and Wells (1998), Kusnadi and Mak (2005), and Yermack (1996) that larger boards are 
associated with lower firm values in Finland, Southeast Asia, and the U.S., respectively 
 Given that our results suggest that dominant shareholders in weaker legal 
regimes can, at least in part, offset the loss in value due to weak legal shareholder 
protection by establishing a strong board, the question arises as to whether a strong board 
can fully make up for the lack of strong legal protection.  To address that question, we 
                                                          
17 We have been told by Credit Lyonnais that this service was discontinued, at least in part, because of the 
unhappiness of some clients with their scores.   
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conduct numerical analyses with the coefficients of our cross-sectional regressions.  As 
might be expected, the degree to which a strong board can offset the loss in value due to 
weak country-level legal shareholder protection depends on the initial level of investor 
protection and the level to which the dominant shareholder aspires.  At the extremes, the 
numerical analysis indicates that a strong board cannot make up the difference in value 
associated with weaker legal shareholder protection.  For example, with all else equal, the 
increase in Q in moving from a country with a legal protection index of 3.3 (such as 
Mexico at the bottom of the range) to a country with a legal protection index of 50.0 
(such as the UK at the top of the range) is greater than the increase in value in moving 
from a board with 10% independent directors to a board with 90% independent directors 
in the same country.   
For narrower differences in legal shareholder protection, a strong board can more 
than compensate for weaker country-level shareholder protection.  For example, the gain 
in value in moving from a country with a legal protection index of 20 to an index of 40 is 
less than the gain in value by moving from a board with 10% independent directors to a 
board with 90% independent directors in the country with a legal index of 20.  Thus, the 
data indicate that a dominant shareholder could ameliorate the loss in value associated 
with a firm having a dominant shareholder and, if the firm’s home-country level of legal 
protection is not too weak, the dominant shareholder can offset the loss fully if he is so 
inclined. 
 
Our analysis of 799 firms with dominant shareholders from 22 countries finds a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between firm value and the percentage of 
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the board made up of directors not affiliated with the dominant shareholder.  This 
relationship is especially pronounced in countries with weak legal protection for 
shareholders.  The implication is that, a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could 
raise the value of his firm by appointing an ‘independent’ board and this would be 
especially so in countries that provide weaker legal protection for shareholders.   
Should the dominant shareholder decide to appoint a strong board, a question that 
arises is whether a sufficiently independent board could recover the full value discount 
associated with the firm operating in a weak legal environment.  To address that question, 
we conduct numerical analyses with the coefficients estimated in column 5 of table III 
(the key variables are LEGAL and ln (INDDIR%)).  To conduct the numerical analyses, 
we use the mean values of the independent variables and set the industry indicator to one 
for the manufacturing sector.  We then vary LEGAL from 3.3 (which represents Mexico 
at the bottom end of the range) to 50 (which represents the US, the UK and Canada at the 
top end of the range).  We vary INDDIR% from 10% to 90%.  With these parameter 
values, we calculate implied Qs.   
As a starting point, of course, given any board composition, firms with a 
dominant shareholder in countries with higher LEGAL scores have higher Qs than those 
in countries with lower LEGAL scores and, given any LEGAL score, firms with more 
directors who are not affiliated with the dominant shareholder have higher Qs than those 
with few directors unaffiliated with the dominant shareholder.  The more interesting 
comparisons involve firms across LEGAL scores and with different board compositions.  
For example, the dominant shareholder in a country such as Mexico, with a LEGAL 
index of 3.3, could increase Q from 1.41 to 1.69 by increasing the percentage of 
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unaffiliated directors from 10% to 90%.  In comparison, a dominant shareholder of a 
similar firm in a country such as the UK, with a LEGAL index of 50, could achieve a Q 
of 2.01 with a board composed of 90% affiliated directors.  That is, even if he were so 
inclined, a dominant shareholder could not make up the full loss in value associated with 
very weak country-level shareholder legal protection by appointing a ‘strong’ board.   
In contrast, a dominant shareholder in a country with moderate legal protection 
could compensate by appointing a strong board.  For example, a dominant shareholder in 
a country such as India, with a LEGAL index of 20, could raise his firm’s Q from 1.63 to 
1.92 by increasing the percentage of independent directors from 10% to 90%.  The 
increase in Q associated with this board restructuring is equivalent to raising legal 
protection from a score of 20 to 40 (the score in Australia).  That is, in a country such as 
India, if he was so inclined, a dominant shareholder could achieve the Q of a firm in 
Australia by appointing an independent board (assuming that the Australian board has 
10% independent directors).  
Of course, the increase in value is not without cost to the dominant shareholder.  
In particular, the theoretical models that analyze the economics of firms controlled by a 
dominant shareholder predict a value discount in such firms and attribute the discount to 
diversion of corporate resources for personal use by the dominant shareholder.  The cost 
to the dominant shareholder of a strong board is the loss of these perquisites of control.  
For the dominant shareholder, the question becomes one of trading off the personal value 
of these lost perquisites against the value increase in his shares.  The value increase will 
only be valuable to the dominant shareholder if he expects to sell shares either from 
personal account or through the firm to raise capital for value increasing projects.  
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Otherwise, there would appear to be little incentive for the shareholder to unilaterally 
appoint a ‘stronger’ board. 
In this framework, dominant shareholders are more likely to choose independent 
directors when their firms have profitable investment opportunities and a shortage of 
internal capital to fund them.  All of this raises the question of what factors determine 
board composition.  We have only explored that question peripherally here in the 2SIV 
analysis.  However, there we find that the “need for funds” is negatively correlated with 
the fraction of independent directors.  Thus, on a preliminary basis, this obvious factor 
does not seem to play a role in determining board composition across countries.   
There have been studies of the determinants of board composition in the US, 
although they do not focus on firms with dominant shareholders.  These include Boone, 
Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2005), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005), Lehn, Patro and 
Zhao (2005), and Linck, Netter and Yang (2005).  Investigation of the determinants 
across countries with different levels of legal shareholder protection would be a useful 
next step in understanding the role of directors in firms with dominant shareholders. 
Throughout we have emphasized that we are interested in the effect of board 
composition in firms with dominant shareholders.  Our motivation is the observation that 
most publicly-traded firms outside the US are controlled by a dominant shareholder.  But 
there are also firms outside the US that are widely-held.  The definition of an independent 
director in such firms would be quite different from the definition used here.  We 
consider directors to be affiliated if they share the same last name and have other direct 
ties to the dominant shareholder.  In widely-held firms where there is no dominant 
shareholder with whom ties can be established, the primary agency conflict is often 
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thought of as being the conflict between management and shareholders rather than the 
conflict between a dominant shareholder and other investors.  Whether a ‘strong’ board 
has a similar role in such firms is a further question to be explored. 
A number of studies have examined the connection between board composition 
and firm value in US firms.  These include AK (1996, 2001), BB (2002), and HW (1991, 
2003).  The consensus view from these studies is that there is no connection between 
board composition and firm value in the US.  This conclusion is not inconsistent with 
ours.  First, these studies do not focus on firms with a dominant shareholder.  Second, the 
definition of an independent director in these studies differs from ours.  Third, even in 
firms with a dominant shareholder, we find that the connection between board 
composition and value derives primarily from countries with low country-level legal 
protection, whereas, in countries with high legal protection, such as the US, board 
composition appears to have much less relation to firm value. 
In conclusion, then, numerous questions about cross-country determinants of 
board composition remain unanswered.  The key result of our study is that firm value is 
positively correlated with the fraction of directors unaffiliated with dominant 
shareholders especially in countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders.   
The implication is that, were he so inclined, a dominant shareholder could increase the 
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Descriptive statistics on firms with a dominant shareholder 
 
This table gives statistics by country for a sample of 782 publicly traded firms with a dominant shareholder from 22 countries.  A firm has a dominant shareholder if 
an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the voting rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index 
measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and the Law and Order index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage 
independent directors is calculated as the number of independent directors divided by board size. A director is considered independent if that board member is not an 
employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not 
have the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and  (e) is 
not a member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. Board size is the number of directors on the firm’s board. Tobin’s Q is the average 
2002-2003 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. Percentage 
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Tobin’s Q across legal and firm-specific characteristics 
 
This table reports the mean and median Tobin’s Qs for 782 firms with a dominant shareholder from 22 countries listed in 
table I classified according to the country’s level of investor protection and other characteristics. A firm has a dominant 
shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the voting rights in the 
firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index as of 2003, where Anti-director 
Rights index is an index measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law and Order index is an index 
measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage independent directors is calculated as the number 
of independent directors divided by board size. A director is considered independent if that board member is not an 
employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board member in any other company or its 
subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the 
same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and  (e) is not a member of government 
when the dominant shareholder is a government. Board size is the number of directors on the firm’s board. Tobin’s Q is the 
average 2002-2003 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of 
assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. Percentage cash flow rights are computed as per Appendix A. P-values for one-sided 
tests are in parentheses.    
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Table III 
Regressions of Tobin’s Q on LEGAL, INDDIR%, board size, and control variables 
 
This table reports the coefficients and p-values for random country effects regressions using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable for 782 industrial firms with a 
dominant shareholder from 22 countries.  A firm has a dominant shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the 
voting rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index as of 2003, where Anti-director Rights index is an index 
measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law and Order index is an index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage 
independent directors is calculated as the number of independent directors divided by board size. A director is considered independent if that board member is not an 
employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have 
the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and  (e) is not a 
member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government.  Board size is the number of directors on the firm’s board. Tobin’s Q is the average 2002-2003 
or 2003-2004 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. Percentage 
cash flow rights are computed as per Appendix A. The natural log of sales and the ratio of intangible-to-total assets are as of year-end 2003.  Sales growth and need for 
external financing, calculated as the difference between historical growth of assets and sustainable growth of assets (i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)), are measured over 2002-2003.  
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Regressions of Tobin’s Q on ln (INDDIR%) and control variables for subsamples classified by 
LEGAL 
 
This table reports the coefficients and p-values for random country effects regressions using Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable for different subsamples of 770 industrial firms with a dominant shareholder from 22 countries classified by 
LEGAL.  A firm has a dominant shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 
10% of the voting rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index 
as of 2003, where Anti-director Rights index is an index measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law 
and Order index is an index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. A director is considered 
independent if that board member is not an employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board 
member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have the same family name as the 
dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and  
(e) is not a member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. Tobin’s Q is the average 2002-2003 of 
(book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of assets) and truncated 
at 1% and 99%. Percentage cash flow rights are computed as per Appendix A. The natural log of sales and the ratio of 
intangible-to-total assets are as of year-end 2003.  Sales growth and need for external financing, calculated as the difference 
between historical growth of assets and sustainable growth of assets (i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)), are measured over 2002-2003.  
The variance of stock returns is calculated with monthly returns over the 24 months 2001-2002. Coefficients are in the 
columns. P-values are in parentheses. 
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Two-stage instrumental variables regressions of ln (INDDIR%) and Tobin’s Q in firms with a 
dominant shareholder 
 
This table reports the coefficients and p-values of simultaneous equations estimated by 2SIV for 770 industrial firms with a 
dominant shareholder from 22 countries. The dependent variables are INDDIR% and Tobin’s Q.  Tobin’s Q is the average 
2002-2003 or 2003-2004 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book 
value of assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. INDDIR% is the percentage of independent directors. A director is 
considered independent if that board member is not an employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is 
not a board member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have the same family name 
as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both 
foreigners, and  (e) is not a member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. The instruments for 
INDDIR% used in the first stage are the firm’s market model alpha and beta (calculated by Worldscope using 23 and 35 
monthly returns).  The instruments for Tobin’s Q are the prior year’s Q, logarithm of prior year’s sales, and single-digit SIC 
indicators.  The coefficients on country indicator variables are included in the models but omitted from the table. A firm has 
a dominant shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the voting 
rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index as of 2003, where 
Anti-director Rights index is an index measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law and Order index is 
an index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com.  Percentage cash flow rights are computed as per 
Appendix A. The natural log of sales and the ratio of intangible-to-total assets are as of year-end 2003.  Sales growth and 
need for external financing, calculated as the difference between historical growth of assets and sustainable growth of assets 
(i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)), are measured over 2002-2003.  The variance of stock returns is calculated with monthly returns over 
the 24 months 2001-2002. Coefficients are in the columns. P-values are in parentheses. 
Panel A:  Two-equation model estimated  for all firms  
 
Coefficients from second stage of 2SIV 





























ln (board size) 
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Cash flow rights 





Need for external financing 


















































































































Panel B:  Two-equation model estimated separately for countries with LEGAL < 20 and LEGAL ≥ 30 
 
Coefficients from second stage of 2SIV 
Firms with  
LEGAL < 20                     
Firms with  
LEGAL ≥ 30 
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Data sources for the percentage of equity voting rights owned by the dominant shareholder in 799 firms with a dominant 
shareholder from 22 countries 
 
The table reports the sources in the order accessed to collate equity ownership information. For each of an initial 1,455 sample firms, we extract the identity and 
percentage of voting rights of each shareholder who holds ≥ 10% of the outstanding voting rights. If such data are available in the first source listed, we use that 
source. If not, we move to the next source until we gather data for each firm. If data are unavailable for year-end 2002, we gather data from year-end 2001. If 
firms have two or more large shareholders, we examine block affiliation to determine whether combined ownership of voting rights exceeds the single largest 
shareholder. If so, these ownership stakes are combined to comprise the single largest shareholder. Using this procedure and moving up the ownership tree we 
establish that 1,055 firms had a dominant shareholder, where a dominant shareholder is an individual, a family, a company, or a government that controls at least 
10% of the voting rights. The fraction of cash flow rights held by the dominant shareholder is determined by the fraction of cash flow rights held by the dominant 
































Company WEB sites; Worldscope; Bloomberg; Major Companies of the Far East and Australasia, http://www.ibisworld.com.au. 
www.euronext.com; Major Companies of Europe; Mergent International Manuals; Bloomberg. 
Edgar international; Reuters; Bloomberg; Bovespa; Company WEB sites. 
FP Survey of Industrials; www.sedar.com; Mergent International Manuals. 
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; Copenhagen Stock Exchange; Major Companies of Europe. 
www.huginonline.com; Major Companies of Europe; Mergent International Manuals; Company WEB sites. 
www.euronext.com; Major Companies of Europe; Company WEB sites; French Company Handbook. 
Major Companies of Europe; Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel and Germany’s Top 500; Company WEB sites; Bloomberg. 
www.capitallink.com; Major Companies of Europe; Mergent International Manuals; Company WEB sites. 
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; Company WEB sites. 
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; National Stock Exchange of India; Stock Exchange Board of India 
www.consob.it; Bloomberg; Major Companies of Europe.  
Japan Company Handbook; Company WEB sites; Bloomberg. 
Stock Market Division of the KRX; Reuters; Bloomberg; Company WEB sites. 
Bursa Malaysia; Kuala Lumpar Stock Exchange; Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Company WEB sites. 
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores; Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Company WEB sites. 
Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Major Companies of Europe, Company WEB sites 
www.cnmv.es; Major Companies of Europe, Mergent International, Company WEB sites; Bloomberg. 
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Company WEB sites. 
www.hemscott.co.uk; Bloomberg; Worldscope; Mergent International; http://www.itruffle.com. 
SEC filings. 
 
 
